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LAW AND LEITERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE. By Robert A. Fergu-
son. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pp. viii, 
417. $22.50. 
The sweeping title - Law and Letters in American Culture - is 
deceptively broad. The book's contents might be better reflected by a 
less resounding title, let us say, Selected American Lawyer-Writers 
from Jefferson to Lincoln, for Ferguson 1 confines his inquiry to only a 
few decades of "American culture" and selects only eleven law-trained 
authors2 from this period for extended treatment. While this latter 
title delineates the scope of Ferguson's inquiry, however, it fails to 
convey his subject, which is, in a phrase that becomes a term of art in 
his hands, the configuration of law and letters. The "now-forgotten 
configuration of law and letters ... dominated American literary aspi-
rations from the Revolution until the fourth decade of the nineteenth 
century" (p. 5). This configuration, for which the "law and letters" of 
the title is presumably an abbreviation, was a discrete historical phe-
nomenon, the effects of which may be traced to a unique confluence of 
cultural influences centered around the American Revolution. 
The configuration began with eighteenth-century lawyers who 
were "professionally dependent upon a fusion of law and literature" 
(p. 6). This was a time when: 
Half of the important critics of the day trained for law, and attorneys 
controlled many of the important journals. Belles lettres societies fur-
nished the major basis of cultural concern for post-Revolutionary 
America; they depended heavily on the legal profession for their mem-
berships. Lawyers also wrote many of the country's first important 
novels, plays, and poems. [p. 5] 
The configuration was largely gone by the mid-nineteenth century, 
when "it was an extraordinary figure indeed who could encompass law 
and literature and remain active in both" (p. 200). During this period, 
the practice oflaw changed dramatically, the social and artistic condi-
tions of authorship were transformed, and the configuration created by 
the "fusion of law and literature" (p. 6) gradually disintegrated. At 
the same time, individual lawyer-writers contributed incrementally to 
the ongoing changes in their professions, responding to the status quo 
as they found it in characteristically diverse ways. 
Throughout the period during which the configuration dominated 
the most literate segment of the American populace, conflict between 
its two constituent elements had both creative and destructive effects 
on writers and their writing. The configuration gave rise, most nota-
1. Robert A. Ferguson (J.D., PhD., Harvard University) is Associate Professor of English at 
the University of Chicago. 
2. The principal authors discussed are Thomas Jefferson, John Trumbull, Royall Tyler, 
Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Charles Brockden Brown, Washington Irving, William Cullen Bry-
ant, Daniel Webster, Richard Henry Dana, Sr., Richard Henry Dana, Jr., and Abraham Lincoln. 
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bly in the United States Constitution, to enduring legal principles and 
cherished legal language, but, as soon as that period of revolutionary 
crisis passed, literary artists began to rebel against their concubinage 
in the house of law and to seek the equal and independent status they 
have now held for nearly a century and a half. It is ironic (though it 
might well not have surprised the deeply pessimistic Founding Fa-
thers3) that American lawyers have come to be widely mistrusted, 
even despised, while literary (and subliterary) artists with no particu-
lar views to impart regarding the public good are vehemently admired 
by the most highly educated classes. 
An awareness of this eventual change in attitudes colors Fergu-
son's description of the configuration's first flowering in the careers of 
Thomas Jefferson and his colleagues, whose communal work product 
was the outgrowth of a common literary education. As clerical influ-
ence waned in the mid-eighteenth century, law became the career of 
choice among those with the power to choose. The lawyer's ideal was 
oratorical versatility and elegance grounded in classical learning. Stu-
dents oflaw sought especially to emulate Cicero, who was admired not 
only for his polished eloquence but for his balanced commitment to 
law, letters, and public service. These early lawyers were generalists, 4 
who often had no more technical legal learning than the study of Wil-
liam Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England could sup-
ply, 5 and "[t]he ultimate goal was what Rufus Choate [found] in John 
Quincy Adams: 'the hived wisdom of a life of study and a life of ac-
tion' " (p. 30). The configuration of law and letters was a product of 
the search for this ideal. 
Realization of the ideal meant "[s]ubordination of literature to 
law" (p. 88). However dedicated the young student might be to let-
ters, the professional "man of letters" was expected to give his best 
energies to his profession and to scribble any purely literary works 
only as his leisure permitted. To the extent that literary excellence 
contributed to law practice, it was in the service of a "legal aesthetic" 
derived from writers like Blackstone, under which, according to Fer-
guson, "[c]reativity really meant the ability to impose order upon un-
ruly material" (p. 33). How different this "aesthetic" is from 
literature's natural or customary ends the reader may judge for herself. 
Both law and letters evolved in the decades after the Revolution. 
Ciceronian orators gave way to technicians learned in positive law. 
Ever-proliferating statutes and case reports provided an extensive new 
3. " 'From the conclusion of this war we shall be going down hill,' Jefferson had predicted as 
early as 1781." P. 99. 
4. "In the absence of statutes and case law, precision in language study became legal exper-
tise." P. 73. 
5. It is instructive to consider how little overlap there is between the University of Michi-
gan's Law Library of 617,000 volumes (as of July 1, 1985) and Thomas Jefferson's "vast library 
of six thousand volumes." P. 334 n.45. 
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source of legal knowledge, and lawyers increasingly were not "men of 
letters" in the traditional sense. 6 At the same time, writers of litera-
ture were developing a more professional notion of authorship - and 
a dim view of lawyers. The "new aesthetic" of romanticism, with its 
focus upon individual experience and its appreciation of the "subver-
sive component" of creativity (p. 271), was out of step with the old 
ideal of instilling civic virtue through the "culminating inclusiveness" 
(p. 217) of forensic eloquence. And the American romantics' frequent 
appeals to natural law to justify their moral stance,7 while establishing 
a common ground with lawyers of an earlier era, set them at odds with 
the legal positivists of their own day. 
As law and letters evolved separately, the configuration, which be-
gan with "symbiosis" (p. 25), reached its "crest" in the speeches of 
Daniel Webster, "its collapse" (p. 241) in the careers of the Richard 
Henry Danas (father and son), "disappeared with the Civil War" (p. 
199), and made a brief reappearance in the speeches of President 
Abraham Lincoln- "the last Blackstone lawyer to lead the nation."8 
Ferguson presents the passing of the configuration as a process of cul-
tural entropy, wherein analytic diffusion gradually breaks down ener-
getic intellectual synthesis. Projecting the trend into the present day, 
he sees "[t]he lawyer's deliberate combination of intellectual breadth, 
artistic insight, and political commitment" give way to "the stark sep-
aration of intellect, art, and politics" (pp. 9-10). 
Ferguson assesses this process harshly. The movement toward 
legal specialization, he suggests, is "a deliberate rejection of compre-
hensive ideas and a corresponding loss in communicative power," and 
legal knowledge has "less and less to do with America's general search 
for self-expression" (p. 290). As an example of what has been lost, 
Ferguson points to the novels of James Fenimore Cooper, who, while 
not a lawyer, "made the law a permanent avocation" (p. 90). This 
avocation brought him into the configuration, where he scrutinized 
American character and institutions "with an impressive precision of 
language and thought." Ferguson concludes: "Cooper always strives 
to make the meaning of America clear - a goal that writers and other 
intellectuals seem to have lost sight of in the twentieth century" (p. 
303). 
Ferguson asserts that attention to the configuration serves two pur-
poses. First, "[t]he central texts of American republicanism acquire 
new coherence from a legal aesthetic just beneath the surface" (p. 7). 
6. The waning efficacy of Daniel Webster's oratory in the face of an "increasingly technical 
jurisprudence" (p. 230) illustrates this change. See pp. 227-35. 
7. Seep. 266 (citing Melville, Emerson, Thoreau, and Hawthorne). 
8. P. 305. Lincoln's use of the configuration was innovative. "No classicist, Lincoln nonethe-
less functions as part of a continuing Ciceronian ideal .... " P. 306. He made up for his lack of 
classical language training through a self-taught linguistic mastery - "a complicated mixture of 
popular dialect, biblical phraseology, and literary cadence." P. 309. 
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Second, reassessment of the writings of this formative period in light 
of the configuration helps to fill a "gap in the American critical tradi-
tion" and to reconstruct the "truncated canon" created by literary 
critics who "tend to skip the eighty years from the Great Awakening 
to the American Renaissance in their haste to associate colonial reli-
. gious preoccupations with the romantic inwardness of the nineteenth 
century" (p. 8). Accordingly, most of this book is devoted to Fergu-
son's readings of selected works by lawyer-writers, including such 
political works as Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia and the 
speeches of Webster and Lincoln. 
Ferguson generally avoids the conclusory aesthetic judgments and 
disparaging disputation one might anticipate from a scholar with an 
agenda of literary rehabilitation. Instead, he supplies a few key in-
sights into the literary methods and goals of lawyer-writers that may 
(or may not) change the way certain texts are read. In his reading of 
Jefferson's Notes, for example, Ferguson finds structural and philo-
sophical correspondences with a constellation of legal treatises that 
suggest a shared aesthetic of ordered inquiry. Topical headings that 
may strike modern readers as artificial and oddly overinclusive were, 
Ferguson contends, "strategies of control" (p. 41) to Jefferson, and 
served to contain the "profound anxiety" (p. 50) and "compulsive 
fears" (p. 53) to which Jefferson and his contemporaries often fell prey 
in the face of the strangeness of the North American continent, the 
backwardness of its populace, and the instability of its government. 
Ferguson characterizes this set of strategies as "an American aesthet-
ics of order and control" (p. 76). 
In a similar way, Ferguson discovers an "aesthetics of cohesion" 
(p. 82) in much of the writing of this period, especially its oratory. 
Derided by Henry David Thoreau for its "hip-hip-hurrah and mutual-
admiration-society style" (p. 239), political speech was purposely 
crafted as a means of controlling what were perceived to be the inher-
ent dangers of America's democratic tendencies. "The speaker's aim 
- one modern readers consistently miss - was to include and incor-
porate listeners, not to challenge their understanding" (p. 80). The 
eloquence deployed within the configuration of law and letters "repre-
sented a means of creating cohesion through the manipulation of emo-
tion" (p. 81). 
Rehabilitating formerly undervalued texts by positing new aes-
thetic criteria is only Ferguson's most direct means of furthering his 
agenda. A frequent theme throughout the central chapters of the book 
is how the configuration's internal tensions and conflicts shaped the 
careers and writings of those working within its confines. Indirectly, 
these tensions affected both the value and the volume of literary pro-
duction during the period. As Ferguson makes plain, the effects could 
be destructive. The configuration's subordination of literature to law 
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gave lawyers a convenient set of "excuses for not writing well" (p. 88) 
and even an excuse for not writing at all. On the other hand, the "vo-
cational anxieties" of young writers who were pressed by poverty and 
a sense of duty to practice law often became a source of insight and 
creative energy. 
Charles Brockden Brown's ambivalent efforts to escape from the 
reality of an impending and uncongenial legal career led to the crea-
tion of novels in which the powerful oppositions within his own 
psyche proliferated into an array of distinct and earnest voices. In his 
discussion of Washington Irving's A History of New York, Ferguson 
traces successful satire and "imagery of estrangement" to an anger 
born of "[v]ocational resentments" (p. 155). The intensity and ab-
stract form of the same "vocational tensions" can be found in the na-
ture poems of William Cullen Bryant, with their recurring 
"juxtaposition of ideal nature against the real world of man" (p. 176). 
The centrality of these tensions is suggested by what happened 
when they were resolved. When Brown finally became a lawyer, his 
career as a novelist was over (p. 131). More tellingly, when Irving 
became a successful author, he lost his anger, and, with it, "the intel-
lectual wit and sharp humor that made him famous" (p. 172). Thus, 
while the configuration may help literary historians to complete a 
"truncated canon" (p. 8), the configuration's effect at the time was to 
truncate a number of literary careers. 
Ferguson's view of the deadening placidity that descended upon 
Bryant's later works exemplifies his use of the configuration to expli-
cate both writings and writers. The thesis put forward by Bryant's 
contemporaries Whittier and Emerson was that Bryant's editorial 
work and political involvement "undermined both his virtue and his 
creativity" (p. 173). The antithesis, offered by Bryant's friends, was 
that he was a man ofletters, and, as such, high-minded enough to keep 
his poetry "chaste and tidy" (p. 174), free of the taint of business. The 
synthesis, proposed by Ferguson, is that: "It was not politics and 
worldly affairs that ruined the poet but a deliberate emotional detach-
ment from these affairs consistent with lifelong goals as a man of let-
ters" (p. 182). That is, once "intrusive tensions" were successfully 
removed, the poetry's placidity - a virtue to some contemporaries, a 
vice to most later readers - followed naturally. 
Law and Letters in American Culture is an interdisciplinary book, 
and it works better in some disciplines than in others. Fundamentally, 
it is a book of history, whose primary texts happen to be works of 
literature written by lawyers. It succeeds very well at recovering a lost 
context within which those texts may be read. As a work of literary 
criticism, it is less satisfying. Ferguson's inquiry is less into individual 
texts - though his readings are sometimes insightful - than into 
common themes and tactics. His frequent use of biography to expli-
1052 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1030 
cate literature tends to disclose historical truth more often than liter-
ary excellence. 
Even Ferguson's assertion that a lost "legal aesthetic'' may be dis-
cerned in these works suggests that his concern is more with historical 
truth than with aesthetic recovery. Does an "aesthetic" preceded by 
such a modifier really help us talk about artistic success? Are we next 
to be introduced to a "political aesthetic," a "business aesthetic," a 
"football aesthetic?" Understanding the concerns, methods, and goals 
of a group of artists is not the same as finding their work beautiful. 
As a final possibility, perhaps this book should be read as a legal 
work, or, more precisely, as an anachronistic part of the configuration 
of law and letters. Ferguson - a contemporary law-trained author -
may be proposing that an aesthetics of order, control, cohesion, and 
collective, open-ended inquiry is in fact relevant to that peculiar and 
remarkably un-self-conscious genre, academic prose. As such, Fergu-
son's work may be less path-breaking than Jefferson's Notes on the 
State of Virginia, but it is commendably true to Jefferson's "legal 
aesthetic." 
- Lee W. Brooks 
